Most of current technologies that enable secure information sharing assume that entities that share information are mutually trustworthy. However, in recent applications this assumption is not realistic. As applications become sophisticated, information systems are required to share information securely even among untrustworthy entities. This paper discusses two kinds of problems about information sharing among untrustworthy entities, i.e. secure statistical data gathering and anonymous authentication, and proposes their solutions. The former is a problem to calculate statistics while ensuring that raw data are not disclosed to any entity including ones that calculate statistics, and the latter is a problem to authenticate entities while keeping their identities confidential.
Introduction
Advances in technologies about information security have been improving efficiency and accuracy of various activities. Now, people can securely do many kinds of businesses with ones who are at different places without time-delay by sharing information. These information sharing assume that entities are mutually trustworthy, or assume the existence of absolutely trustable mechanisms such as TCB (Trusted Computing Base) (2) (4) . For example, a person sends ciphered messages to other person to be deciphered, because the message sender trusts the recipient not to use the received information for unauthorized purposes. Credit card holders put their passwords into cashing machines believing that these machines do not disclose their passwords to others.
However in recent applications, this assumption is becoming unrealistic. Although it is possible to restrict kinds of information treated and entities that treat information to limited ones in conventional applications, it is not the same in recent ones, such as ubiquitous computing. Every kind of information is exchanged among various, widely distributed and even unknown entities. Therefore, it is not possible to assume the existence of absolutely trustworthy entities, and current security technologies are not enough. In the above example, ciphering technologies ensure that unauthorized entities cannot understand the meanings of messages even if they can eavesdrop on them, but they can easily understand their meanings when the authorized recipient discloses them. In environments, in which even mutually untrustworthy entities share information, messages must be protected not only from eavesdropping but also from the recipient's malicious and/or accidental unauthorized uses.
As attempts to achieve secure information sharing among untrustworthy entities, this paper proposes mechanisms that treat two kinds of problems, i.e. secure statistical data gathering and anonymous authentication. Secure statistical data gathering is a problem to calculate statistics while ensuring that individual raw data are not disclosed to any entity including ones that calculate statistics. Although disclosure of statistical data such as averages and variances is allowed, in many cases, raw data of individual data sources are confidential. Employees of a company agree to disclose averages of their salaries, but they do not agree to disclose their individual salaries, for example. In other words, the objective of the statistics calculation is not the acquisition of information about individual raw data; it is the acquisition of the information about aggregated data. In order to achieve this objective, in conventional information systems, it is assumed that the entity responsible to gather individual raw data is trustworthy, i.e. the statistical data processing entity is assumed not to disclose raw data to outside. However, as the volume and importance of data to be gathered is increasing, this assumption becomes unrealistic. The entity that gathers individual raw data may involve many sub-entities, then, it becomes difficult to maintain them to be trustworthy. Opportunities of intentional or accidental data disclosure become more likely, and the statistical data processing entity cannot afford to take risks of disclosing these data. Therefore, it must be considered that even the entity, which calculates statistics, may disclose raw data to outside intentionally or accidentally. Consequently, secure statistical data gathering mechanisms become inevitable.
Anonymous authentication is a problem to determine if entities are authorized ones or not while maintaining their identities confidential. Here, the authenticating authority authenticates entities as authorized ones, but entities to be authenticated cannot trust the authenticating authority, e.g. the authority may disclose names of the entities to outside. It is easy to determine if people, who are going to enter a door, are authorized ones or not by people's showing of their identifications (IDs) and passwords to an access checking machine. But, the access checking machine can disclose names of persons who used the door to outside. In many cases, this kind of data disclosure must be prevented in order to avoid unauthorized uses of them. Personal visiting records of facilities that reveal the working patterns of visitors may be used for malicious purposes. Here, the necessary information for authenticating authorities is not the entities themselves to be authenticated, authenticating authorities need to know only if entities are the authorized ones or not. Anonymous authentication relates to this kind of problems; it relates to situations, in which validity of data must be checked but at the same time data themselves should be kept confidential. In the above example, in which accesses to a door is checked, anonymity of the person who visited the facility can be maintained easily by preparing the password that is common among authorized visitors. But in this case, the possibility of password leaks becomes higher. Also, every expiration of a visitor's right requires the password change, and all visitors must be aware of the new password. More secure and convenient mechanisms are necessary.
In the following sections, solution mechanisms of these two problems are proposed and their performances are discussed. Several mechanisms that enable secure information sharing among mutually untrustworthy entities, especially for the anonymous authentication, had been proposed already. Untraceable payment mechanism (1) enables people to purchase goods by electric moneys securely without disclosing names of money holders to banks, but the bank knows to whom it issues the electric moneys. In anonymous auction (3) , winners of the auction can get the goods without revealing their identities. However, authentications of participants of the auction are carried out in the same way as by the common password in the entrance checking machine example, i.e. participants, who obey the predefined protocol, are assumed to be authorized ones. Either refreshable anonymous token (5) , which enables token holders to extend effectiveness of their access rights anonymously, cannot ensure that the token holders are authorized ones, i.e. they can use tokens even after cancellations of their access rights. Of course it is possible to attach expiration time to tokens, but this kind of information is the strong support for identifying token holders. Different from these mechanisms, the anonymous authentication mechanism proposed here enables the authenticating authority to authenticate entities by examining their latest and exact passwords without knowing their values. Regarding to secure statistical data gathering, although anonymous tokens can be used also for it, it does nod protect raw data themselves. It only hides data sources, but in many cases, it is possible to identify data sources by other ways, e.g. by tracing communication channels. Different from existing mechanisms, the proposed secure statistical data gathering mechanism does not disclose raw data even in encrypted forms.
Secure Statistical Data Gathering

The Mechanism
In the mechanism proposed for secure statistical data gathering problem, it is assumed that an individual data source S j has a set of numerical data {d 1j , d 2j , ---, d mj } corresponding to data items {D 1 , D 2 , ---, D m }. The objective of the mechanism is to enable the coordinator to calculates averages of
/N while disabling any entity except S j itself to reconstruct d kj from the data disclosed by S j (j = 1, ---, N). Here, m and N are the numbers of data items and data sources, respectively, and it is assumed that m is not less than N.
The mechanism is based on a strategy of aggregated data disclosure. According to the strategy, individual data source S j calculates a set of independent linear combinations of its data d kj , i.e. a set of
, however S j does not disclose all of them. Namely, S j divides {v 1j , v 2j , ---, v mj } into 2 groups, i.e. {u 1j , u 2j , ---, u sj } and {w 1j , w 2j , ---, w tj }, and discloses only {u 1j , u 2j , ---, u sj } to other data sources.
Instead of disclosing {w 1j , ---, w tj }, S j discloses w h = (w h1 + w h2 + ---+ w hN )/N (h = 1, ---, t) to the coordinator while calculating them based on the data disclosed by other data sources. Because m ≥ N, it is possible to assign linear combinations to data sources so that the averages of all linear combinations are disclosed to the coordinator while individual S j does not disclose at least 1 linear combination to other data sources. Then, because the coordinator is informed of averages of m independent linear combinations of m data items, it can calculate averages {d 1 , ---, d m } by solving linear equations, provided that it knows coefficients {C 1p , C 2p , ---, C mp } (p = 1, ---, m). On the other hand, any entity except S j itself cannot reconstruct d kj from the disclosed data, because they know at most only m-1 independent linear combinations of {d 1j , d 2j , ---, d mj }. Here, the division of {v 1j , v 2j , ---, v mj } is done in the following way, i.e. let assume u qj = v u(q, j)j and w rj = v w(r, j)j for some u(q, j) and w(r, j), respectively, then sets of integers U j = {u(1, j), u(2, j), ---, u(s,j)} and W j = {w(1, j), w(2, j), ---, w(t, j)} that satisfy the following conditions can be defined.
1. U j W j = {1, 2, ---, m}, U j W j = , and W j for each j, 2. W j W k = , when j k, and
(this condition can be induced from conditions 1 and 2) From conditions 1 and 2, every data source S k except S j discloses v w(r,j)k to S j (for every k except j, U k includes w(r, j) when w(r, j)∊ W j ), and from conditions 3, there exists data source S k that calculates v p , for every p.
The assumption m ≥ N is necessary so that every data source can conceal at least 1 linear combination of data items; but problems that do not satisfy the assumption can be modified to ones that satisfy it by dividing data sources into several groups so that the number of data sources in each group does not exceed m, or by adding m' number of dummy data items so that (m + m') satisfies (m + m') ≥ N. Addition of dummy data brings the increase of computation load, but if they are generated randomly, it makes individual data more secure. 
, and sends {C kp } to all data sources. Also the coordinator assigns positive integers a(j) (the identifiers of data items: 1 ≤ a(j) ≤ m) to individual data sources S j (j = 1, ---, N), so that different integers are assigned to different data sources. Then individual data source S j calculates v qj (q = 1, 2, ---, m), and sends v qj to the data source that is corresponded to the integer q, i.e. data source S k that satisfies a(k) = q. Data source S j also calculates v a(j) =(v a(j)1 +---+v a(j)N )/N based on the information sent from other data sources, and returns the results to the coordinator. Finally the coordinator reconstructs the averages of data items.
Although only averages of data items are considered in the above discussion, it is also possible to apply the mechanism to calculate other statistical data, such as variances, co-variances, histograms, and maximum and minimum values as follows.
Variances and co- to other data sources, random numbers are substituted for other data items Z q (q k). Because raw values of Z k are disclosed only as forms of linear combinations with random numbers, neither the coordinator nor other data sources can estimate whether S j has x as the value of its data item or not. However, it is necessary to iterate the above process for individual values of the data item. Maximum and minimum value calculations are trivial when histograms are acquired. As described above, secure statistical data gathering mechanism enables calculations of various typical statistics without disclosing individual raw data to the outside.
Threats to the Mechanism
This sub-section discusses the possible threats to the proposed mechanism with regard to raw data disclosure of individual data sources. Different from usual security mechanisms, eavesdropping on information exchanged among entities and malicious software modifications are not serious threats to the secure statistical data gathering mechanism as described below. Most serious threat to it is the raw data disclosure by conspiracy among the coordinator and data sources.
Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is the potential threat to all kinds of information systems, but the proposed mechanism has substantial advantages in this regard. If statistical data are not confidential, even encryption is not necessary for exchanging messages, because complete information about individual raw data is not exchanged among entities.
Malicious software modification
Modifications of programs are not serious as threats to raw data disclosure. Because the coordinator does not contain raw data, software designers can concentrate efforts for protecting malicious software modifications on programs around data sources. When individual data sources are isolated, it is enough to check messages of data sources, because raw data can be disclosed only through their messages.
Conspiracy among entities
Among of various threats to the mechanism, information leaks caused by conspiracy among the coordinator and data sources are the most serious ones. The proposed mechanism avoids the occurrence of data disclosure by confining a part of the information owned by individual data sources in owners themselves, under the assumption that individual data sources want to maintain confidentiality of their information. Therefore, the mechanism works securely only when individual data sources do not disclose their complete information. When the coordinator has exact information about raw data of all data sources except data source S j , it is easy to exactly estimate raw data of S j from the disclosed information, i.e. it is trivial to calculate
Consequently, when all entities except data source S j conspire with each other, i.e. when they disclose their raw data to the coordinator, raw data of S j may easily be estimated. Even in the case where some data sources are not involved in the conspiracy, the precision of the estimation is still high. However, it must be noticed that this threat is not derived from the mechanism, i.e. any form of statistical data discloses particular data when other data are known. The most realistic way to keep the number of data sources involved in the conspiracy small enough is to notify the coordinator of data sources that involved in statistics calculations as late as possible, so that the coordinator cannot identify data sources with which it should conspire. Therefore, the mechanism is suitable for cases where a large number of data sources exist and statistics calculations can be divided into many sub-calculations, each of which is executed by randomly selected data sources. In these cases, the coordinator knows the data sources involved in each sub-calculation just before its execution. However, data sources involved in individual sub-calculations must be determined by the cooperation among data sources, not by the coordinator; then the mechanism becomes more complicated. Distribution of statistical data processing functions to individual data sources is the primary reason that enables the proposed secure statistical data gathering mechanism to calculate statistics without disclosing raw data as described above. But at the same time, this distribution brings about several drawbacks of the mechanism besides the above-mentioned weakness against data leaks caused by conspiracy among malicious entities. The most serious one is the fact that data sources involved in the statistics calculation must behave synchronously, and all data sources must wait for the completion of the calculation. For example, when some data sources are out of operations, all data sources must wait for long time. The problem becomes more difficult to treat when data sources consist of mobile ones. On one hand, program executions on data sources and communications among them become less stable, and on the other hand, for individual data sources, affects of long time waiting of calculation results from other data sources decrease their performances, e.g. they may exhaust powers of batteries. Dividing data sources into small groups to avoid including too many data sources in the statistics calculation mitigates the difficulty, but statistics calculations among small data sources increase the opportunities of conspiracy. Therefore, mechanisms must be developed that enable asynchronous statistics calculations. Preparing agents that execute calculations on behalf of data sources is one of the solutions, but it introduces new security problems, such as forged agents and malicious attacks on agents.
The other drawback of the mechanism is that individual data sources must have various kinds of statistical data processing abilities. In the previous sections, only averages, variances, co-variances, histograms, and minimum and maximum values are considered, but actual applications require various other kinds of statistics. More efforts are required to design and implement programs that are distributed to data sources and the coordinator compared with the case where primary programs are installed only on the coordinator. Also the programs installed on individual data sources must be modified or extended every time when new kinds of statistics are required. Mobile agent technologies may reduce the difficulty of this problem by enabling the coordinator to timely send software of the newest versions to individual data sources. However, individual data sources are required to have the same kind of computing platforms, therefore the extension of data sources to various ones becomes to be limitted. Also frequent sending of programs to data sources increases opportunities of virus attacks on data sources.
Anonymous Authentication
The Mechanism
The mechanism proposed for anonymous authentication problem enables entities to be authenticated as authorized ones without disclosing their identities, based on password selection strategy. In the mechanism a server (the authenticating authority) determines whether a client (entities to be authenticated), which is characterized by its identification code (ID) and password pair, is an authorized one or not. Different from conventional mechanisms, according to password selection strategy, the client does not show its ID and password pair to the server. Instead of showing an ID and password pair, the client finds its password in the password list, which is generated by the server, and declares whether its password is included in the list or not in the following way.
Firstly, the client generates D, a list of IDs that includes the ID of the client itself. Also the client designates the position where its own ID is located in D. After that, the server registers all passwords that correspond to items in D to the password list P, while maintaining their order in the list as designated by the client, and each password p in P is encrypted by using secret random bit pattern r, that is, each password p is replaced by p = p XOR r (exclusive-or of p and r). At the same time the server calculates r = E(r, K), and send p and r to the client. Here, E and K are a one-way encryption function and its encryption key, respectively. Then, the client finds out its encrypted password p in P (it is possible because items in P are ordered as designated by the client), and calculates r' as the result of XOR of p and the password that the client is memorizing. Also the client calculates r' = E(r', K) while using the same encryption function E and key K as the server, and send r' back to the server, when it confirms that r = r'. Finally the server authenticates the clients when r = r'.
It is easy to prove that the server can authenticate authorized clients while not knowing their identities by the above procedure. Namely, the facts that 1) only clients that have authorized ID and password pairs are authenticated, and 2) the data provided by clients to the server include no information for identifying the clients under the assumption that the server intends to continue the service, can be proved as follows. Regarding to 1), the server authenticates the client when r = r'. However, because r' = p XOR p' = p XOR r XOR p' (p' is the password that the client maintains) coincides with r only when p = p' is satisfied, clients that do not have p as their password cannot be authenticated. Concerning 2), a client provides the server with 2 kinds of data, i.e. D (a list of IDs) and r'. Apparently, all IDs in D have the equal probability that the server expects them as the ID to be authenticated. On the other hand, from r' returned by clients, the server can identify the client to be authenticated (in the remainder this is written as AC), only when AC returns the different bit pattern as r' from other clients. The server can do this by assigning different bit patterns to different passwords in P, or altering passwords in P except the one corresponding to AC. In the former case individual clients return different bit patterns, and in the latter case, clients except AC return bit patterns different from r, because their passwords in P are altered. However because D includes no information, in both cases, the server may send AC a bit pattern that corresponds to a password of other client as r, i.e. it must send r while taking the risk that r does not coincide with r'. This means that the probability that r = r' becomes less than 1 if the server tries to identify AC; therefore the probability that r does not coincide with r' becomes 1 as the number of trials increases, consequently the server eventually loses its reputation and cannot continue its service.
In this way, the proposed mechanism enables the server to authenticate the client without knowing its identity. In actual applications, in order to protect irrelevant passwords in the password list from being disclosed to the client, they are encrypted by a one-way encryption function before calculating XOR. Figure  2 shows the precise behavior of the mechanism. Firstly the j-th client C j generates ID list D, a set of numbers corresponding to IDs of clients that includes j itself, and sends D to the server. Here, each number in D is calculated as a random number so that the server cannot identify C j form D. After receiving D, the server makes password list P corresponding to IDs included in D. Namely, it arranges passwords corresponding to individual IDs in D, in the same order as in D. After that, p = E(p, K) is calculated for each password p in P. Then the server replaces password p in P with q = p XOR r, calculates r = E(r, K), and sends P, K and r to the client. Here, a function E is a one-way encryption function, which is known also by clients, K is a randomly generated encryption key, and r is a secret random bit pattern.
Client C j , that receives P, K and r, firstly, finds item q that corresponds to C j in P, and encrypts its own password p', i.e. calculates p' = E(p', K), so as to calculate r' = q XOR p'. At this
time because r is not disclosed to C j , C j can calculate r' that coincides with r, only when C j has the correct password, i.e. in this case, r' = q XOR p' = p XOR r XOR p' = p XOR r XOR p = r is satisfied. Therefore, the server can decide whether C j is an authorized client or not by comparing r' sent from C j with r. As mentioned before, the server can identify C j by assigning random bit pattern r only to C j , or by modifying passwords in P except that of C j , so that the client that can return r is limited to C j . These situations also can be prevented by C j 's examination of r. When the server executes the above dishonest operations, the probability that r does not coincide with r' becomes greater than 0, because D includes no information about the client to be authenticated. Then C j eventually detects the dishonesty of the server.
Usually, programs that execute procedures necessary for clients in Fig.2 are implemented on mobile computers with limited computing powers and memories. Fortunately, these programs includes only encryption processes and small arithmetic and logical calculations, they do not include any decryption process. Therefore, even small mobile computers can execute these programs quickly with small amount of energy consumption.
Threats to the Mechanism
The proposed anonymous authentication mechanism is the one that protects facilities from being accessed by unauthorized users. Therefore, it must withstand various threats that enable illegal accesses to facilities, in addition to rejecting unauthorized passwords to be authenticated while maintaining confidentiality of identities of entities to be authenticated. Possible threats that must be considered include eavesdropping on passwords, acquisition of passwords by other clients, malicious software modifications, and client identification by the server as described below.
Eavesdropping on password Because the server sends multiple passwords to clients at a time in the mechanism, affects of eavesdropping are more serious than in usual systems. However, at least theoretically, there is no reason that messages exchanged between the server and clients in the proposed mechanism are less secure than messages exchanged in other systems. Encryption is effective to protect messages from eavesdropping.
Passwords acquisition by other clients
One of the most serious threats to clients in this mechanism is the acquisition of their passwords by other clients. The server discloses passwords of irrelevant clients to the client that needs authentication; although they are encrypted, the client knows a list of client IDs D, the encryption function E and the encryption key K. Therefore, the client that request authentication can iteratively try to encrypt possible passwords, such as birthdays of password holders, until the results match with the ones sent from the server. At least two kinds of aspects can be considered to mitigate this threat, the one is strength of passwords themselves, and the other is anonymity of IDs in the ID list D. The strength of passwords can be improved by using longer passwords and by changing them frequently. Long and varying passwords make it difficult to try many possibilities; even when the client finds plain passwords of other clients, they are not effective already at that time. Therefore they are considered to be enough to protect clients from this threat, but anxiety about possible leaks increases refusal attitudes toward this mechanism, and hinders the adoption of the mechanism. Regarding to the second aspect, passwords leaked to the client do not have any meaning when the client has no information about IDs that correspond to leaked passwords. The simplest way to make D anonymous is to transfer the responsibility to generate and manage ID lists from clients to other neutral entities. In this case, the only thing that the client can do about D is to designate the location of its ID; it cannot have any information about IDs of other clients included in D. However in this case, conspiracy between the server and this neutral entity enables identifications of clients to be authenticated. It is easy for the neutral entity to tell the server the exact ID of the client that requests the authentication, because the client designates the position of its ID in D, and this is just the case that the proposed mechanism tries to exclude.
Software modifications by malicious server or clients
The previous threat becomes realistic when clients modify random number generation programs for making ID lists. Clients can attack the weakest password by including it in ID lists at every authentication request. Therefore, efforts to maintain randomness of ID lists are necessary. Regarding to other software, affects of modifications are not so serious. Undesirable effect of them is the denial of authentications at worst, and basically it does not bring any benefit to the server and clients, as far as illegal facility accesses and password acquisitions are concerned.
Client identification by the server
The server can identify clients that request authentications at least by two ways, i.e. by preparing the large ID space and by analyzing ID lists that are sent from clients with their authentication requests. Regarding to the former threat, when the server prepares the large ID space compared with the number of clients, so that most items in the ID lists randomly selected by clients are not corresponded to actual clients, the server can narrow the possible clients that request authentications. This threat can be mitigated by making the size of the ID list as large as possible. However, to increase the size of ID lists is not preferable at least in two reasons. Firstly, it increases the possibility of password leaks, i.e. more passwords, even they are encrypted, are sent to irrelevant clients, and secondly, it decreases the system performance, e.g. increase of message volumes and computation time for encryption. Therefore, non-technical measures, such as the regulation that obliges the server to disclose the total number of clients, are desirable. Clients can suspect that the server is malicious, when they are assigned large IDs compared with the total number of clients. Regarding to the second threat, it is likely that clients that appeared in ID lists frequently compared with other clients actually requested authentications. Therefore, the server can easily extract clients that request authentications frequently. The less preferable way to mitigate this threat is to prepare large ID lists, so that clients that do not request authentications also appear frequently in them. The other way is to assign multiple ID and password pairs to single clients. The server cannot identify clients even they request authentications frequently, because clients change their IDs every time. However, mechanisms are required to register these multiple ID and password pairs anonymously, in order to maintain relations among these pairs confidential. Although it is easy for clients to define aliases of their ID and password pairs anonymously by using the proposed mechanism itself, these aliases can be used even after clients lose their access rights. But addition of expiration time to these aliases does not help the server to identify clients, different from anonymous tokens [1] , [5] .
Although the proposed mechanism enables authentications of clients without identifying them, it has several disadvantages also in non-security issues. Most of them are introduced by the fact that the mechanism requires the server to send passwords, which are irrelevant to clients to be authenticated. Namely, the server must send large sizes of messages that decrease the performance of the total system. Also, individual clients are required to possess abilities for executing encryption functions and storing password lists, and this makes it difficult to cheaply implement the mechanism as access control systems for physical facilities. Different from access controls of information in computer systems, in those of physical facilities, entities, such as persons or parcels, must bring portable terminals to execute clients' procedures so as to access facilities. Complicated functions and large amount of data make these terminals bigger and more energy consuming. Also, modifying programs and data of these portable terminals are more difficult than those of computers connected each other by stable networks.
Conclusion
Importance of mechanisms for sharing information even among untrustworthy entities is increasing rapidly as application areas of information systems are expanding. As ones of those mechanisms, secure statistical data gathering and anonymous authentication mechanisms are proposed. They enable to calculate statistical data while not disclosing individual raw data, and to authenticate entities while maintaining confidentiality of their identities. Although several drawbacks remain still in the proposed mechanisms, it can be expected that more sophisticated processing that are required in expanding applications can be developed over these mechanisms. Among of problems discussed, mitigation of inconveniences caused by synchronous operations of data sources, and the removal of refusal attitudes because of irrelevant password disclosure in password list even in encrypted forms, are the most serious ones, regarding to statistical data gathering and anonymous authentication mechanisms, respectively. They are one of the key problems to be solved for making these mechanisms applicable to variety of applications.
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